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Introduction The toll capitalist production takes on thelives and health of workers has been, and continuesto be one of its least acceptable features. For this
reason, the labour movement and political parties seeking
labour's support have often made reform of occupational
health and safety regulation a major objective. In recent
years, for example, the New Democratic Party in Ontario
has vociferously criticized the failures of the governments
of the day to protect adequately the workers in the pro-
vince.! Their recent electoral success provides a great op-
portunity to improve the work environment and to strengthen
the ability of the labour movement to influence decision
making in this regard at both the provincial and enterprise
levels.
One of the more recent strategies in health and safety
regulation has been an enhanced role for direct worker par-
ticipation, especially at the work place level. Since the
1970s, workers in Ontario, and most other Canadian juris-
dictions, have been given a variety of statutory rights in-
cluding the right to know the hazards present in the work
place, the right to be consulted on health and safety matters
by management and the right to refuse unsafe work.2 Col-
lectively, these rights are said to comprise an "internal
responsibility system" (IRS), through which compliance
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with legal standards, and improvement of the level of health
and safety in the work place are to be achieved.f Indeed,
these statutory rights distinguish this IRS from market
regulation and give it a legitimacy which earlier self-com-
pliance approaches to enforcement lacked. More recently,
the now defeated Liberal government enacted Bill 208, the
first major legislative reform of the new regulatory regime
created by the Occuptational Health and Safety Act (OHSA)
in 1978.4 It was clear from the major provisions of this bill
that the government hoped to shift a greater degree of
regulatory responsibility onto labour and capital by creating
new, and strengthening old, bipartitite structures. Not only
were workers and employers to jointly achieve compliance
at the local level; now they were to begin delivering other
health and safety services at the provincial level, beginning
with education and training.I
The attitude of the labour movement towards this ap-
proach has been ambiguous and far from uniform. On the
one hand, it has been extremely critical of the particular
version of the IRS contained in OHSA and implemented
by the Ministry of Labour. On the other hand, it is attracted
by the Scandinavian model. Divisions within the labour
movement over Bill 208 reflected different views over the
appropriate role of and structures for worker participation,
and are likely to raise difficulties in plotting a strategy for
future reform under an NDP government. It would be useful,
therefore, to critically examine the Swedish approach to
occupational health and safety regulation to see what lessons
might be learned from their experience. In particular, this
paper explores the conditions of participation in two ways.
First, under what conditions are opportunities for worker
participation in health and safety regulation created and se-
cond, under what conditions is participation effective.
The methodology of the study builds on recent work in
political economy which has rejected the view that social
developments are the outcome of the logic of the mode of
production and its internal contradictions. Instead, there has
been a movement to bring workers, states, institutions, ideo-
logies and other elements of the social formation "back in"
to the analysts." In order to investigate the complex inter-
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actions between these elements in a social formation or in
one of its subsystems, the concept of a "regime" has been
employed." The concept itself, however, does little other
than to suggest the presence of certain stabilizing
regularities as well as potentially de-stabilizing conflicts.
More specification is required.
The power resource model developed by Korpi and others
provides a valuable starting point for identifying and analyz-
ing the forces and relations operating within a regime of
regulation.f It focuses on the relative strength of the work-
ing class, measured primarily by the strength of unions and
social democratic parties, to explain differences in the
development of welfare states. There is a need, however,
to specify both the conditions for power mobilization and
the direction of its deployment, and to apply this analysis
to the development of power resources by employers so
that the focus on the relative strength of class forces is not
lost.? Moreover, it is necessary to examine the institutional
forms and characteristics of the state's various subsystems,
including the law and administration. Although regime in-
stitutionalization, especially in regard to the functions as-
sumed by the state and the development of its administrative
capacities, is profoundly influenced by the historical
development of power resources, its legacy affects their fu-
ture. The establishment of strong welfare state regimes that
constrain the market and embrace a commitment to direct
worker participation in the administration of public pro-
grams and private enterprises enhances the opportunities
for the development of future power resources and provides
more strategic space for their deployment.
This framework is particularly well-suited to an analysis
of worker participation in industry generally. It overcomes
the deficiencies of conventional industrial relations studies
of worker participation, often rooted in a pluralist paradigm,
which focus on the minutiae of organizational structure
without ever acknowledging, or coming to grips with class
power and conflict.l? Moreover, because class power and
its mobilization are located in a complex web of social,
economic, political and institutional relations, it becomes
easier to both identify and explain the contradictory forces
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and possibilities which produce and are produced by par-
ticipatory structures. Finally, by analyzing the conditions
of participation in this way, we can more easily assess the
likelihood of the Swedish model being adopted and suc-
cessfully implemented in Ontario.
Constructing the Conditions of Participation in Sweden
Like Canada, Sweden developed a liberal model of health
and safety regulation in the nineteenth century but, unlike
Canada, it began to elaborate a social democratic alternative
in the first decades of the twentieth. The central institution
of health and safety regulation in the early period was the
market, although customary practices continued to play a
minor role in establishing the rights and duties of the par-
ties.!' For workers, participation in regulatory decision
making was to occur through bargaining, but for most this
meant accepting terms unilaterally dictated by their em-
ployers. In response, craft workers formed trade unions to
protect their status and bolster their power. Typically, they
attempted to "bargain" by agreeing amongst themselves that
they would only work at certain rates and only with mem-
bers of their union. If conditions were favourable, employers
who refused to accept these conditions would be boycotted.
This strategy met with some success some of the time for
a relatively small group of workers. Any weakness in craft
organization or changes in technology or labour market con-
ditions, however, threatened to undercut the power resources
upon which this strategy depended.l- Dissatisfaction with
market regulation led workers to seek protective legislation.
The first steps in this direction were taken in the 1880s at
a time when labour militancy was growing and political
activity increasing, despite restrictions on the franchise.P
As in other countries, early concern was directed primarily
at child labour. Pre-industrial laws curbing the abuse of
child labour remained in force through the nineteenth cen-
tury, but were totally ineffective. In 1881 a Royal Ordinance
was enacted to protect minors. Fierce resistance by em-
ployers, however, led the government to delay declaring
the law in force several times and then to weaken its provi-
sions by amendment. Moreover, enforcement responsibility
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was conferred on local health committees and municipal
councils which lacked the authority to fulfill their mandate.
In 1889, two years after the great mobilizing election of
1887 around the tariff, the Occupational Hazards Act was
enacted, to protect industrial workers.H
This legislation imposed a general duty on employers to
maintain safe and healthy work conditions. As well, some
more specific obligations were set out and these were to
be enforced by state-appointed inspectors. The shift in the
locus of regulatory decision making from the market to the
political-administrative system, however, was only partial.
In effect, by delegating discretionary authority to enforce-
ment officials, a disjuncture was created between the more
publicly accessible political system and the effective centre
of decision making, the inspectors. Here a number of factors
weighed against workers who sought to have the legislation
vigourously enforced. Only three inspectors were initially
appointed to enforce the law. This was a woefully inade-
quate allocation of resources which significantly limited the
possible success of any enforcement strategy. As well, em-
ployers had better access to the inspectors and were in a
position to retaliate against employees who complained to
the inspectors. Although continued political action suc-
ceeded in Obtaining minor amendments to the legislation
and the appointment of more inspectors, the laws remained
ineffective. As a result, contract negotiation, whether in-
dividual or collective, continued to be an important, if not
the primary, means of influencing employer decision making
over health and safety.IS
This model of regulation was typical of most western
industrializing nations during this period, including On-
tario.I6 It was only in the beginning of the twentieth century
that the foundations for a more social-democratic regime
of regulation began to be laid. A principle cause of this
divergence lay in the different paths of development fol-
lowed by working class organizations in various countries.
These differences can be traced along four dimensions. First,
Swedish unions adopted the principle of industrial, rather
than craft, organization relatively early.J7 Second, trade
union organization was highly centralized.If Third, the
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Swedish labour movement grew fairly steadily from the
1890s onwards. Although it suffered a major defeat in 1909,
it recovered and grew rapidly during the 1920s, a period
during which many other labour movements suffered devas-
tating defeats.l? Finally, the Swedish labour movement was
closely intertwined with the Social Democratic Party (SAP)
founded in 1889.20
As a result of these developments, the Swedish working
class built a comparatively powerful labour market and poli-
tical organization. Furthermore, the ideological orientation
of the Swedish labour movement was becoming more
socialist, even though it was decidedly reformist in its stra-
tegy. The Swedish union movement did not seek just to
protect the material interests of its members; rather, it sought
to promote the interests of all workers as a class. This was
reflected in its early commitment to industrial unionism and
to complete penetration of unionisation. Further, the SAP
saw itself as the political arm of the workers' movement
and believed that socialism could be achieved by obtaining
universal sufferage and then legislating an end to capitalist
exploitation and inequality.J!
The greater power resources of the Swedish labour move-
ment and their more socialist ideological orientation did
not stop the transformation of capitalist production in the
early decades of the twentieth century. Indeed, one of the
effects of the centralized character of the trade union move-
ment, together with highly concentrated ownership in the
Swedish economy, was to give impetus to cooperation
amongst employers who, from the 1890s onwards, formed
federations, culminating with the creation in 1902 of SAF,
a national employers' organization designed to deal with
unions. Given the organizational resources of the labour
movement, SAP adopted a strategy which accepted unions
as a fact of life, and instead fought to secure certain prin-
ciples which all of its members would adhere to whenever
concluding a collective agreement. In particular, SAP fought
to gain and maintain managerial control over production in
their enterprises, including the preservation of the open
shop. This was embodied in Article 23 (later 32) of their
constitution which required that all members include a
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clause in any collective bargaining agreement made with a
union, "stipulating the right of the employer to engage and
dismiss workers at his own discretion; to direct and allot
work; and to avail himself of workers belonging to any
organization whatsoever, or to none."22
Although the Swedish labour movement initially resisted
this attempt to restrict the scope of collective bargaining,
in the December Compromise of 1906 it conceded manage-
ment's rights to hire and fire and to organize work in ex-
change for union recognition. Also in that year an act was
passed which provided optional conciliation services to em-
ployers and unions unable to reach agreement.23 Otherwise,
the state remained fairly inactive, although decisions of the
Supreme Court of Sweden in 1915, arising out of law suits
brought by employers in respect of a general strike in 1909,
declared that the collective agreement was a binding con-
tract.24 It was not until 1928, however, that a statute was
enacted, over the objections of the labour movement, making
collective agreements legally binding and making strikes
and lockouts over their interpretation illegal. A Labour
Court was set up to adjudicate such disputes, and although
the legislation said nothing about managerial rights, the
court held that, in the absence of express language in a
collective agreement, clause 32 was implied as part of the
agreement. Even after the social democrats came to power
in 1932, nothing was done to alter the 1928 law or the
court's interpretation of its effect. Indeed, the basic prin-
ciples of the 1906 Compromise were reaffirmed in the Basic
Agreement of 1938 negotiated between LO and SAP. The
only legislative change was the 1936 Act which legally
guaranteed a worker's right to join a trade union and re-
quired employers to negotiate with those unions.2S
The process of achieving an accord between labour and
capital was not a smooth one. Sweden experienced one of
the highest rates of industrial conflict in any western in-
dustrial country up until the mid-1930s.26 Notably, though,
the accord was reached without a high level of active state
intervention, despite the electoral success of the SAP after
1932. Moreover, labour did not mount a serious challenge
to managerial control. Instead, mechanisms for joint con-
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sultation were established whereby information and advice
about these issues might be exchanged. A Works Council
agreement was negotiated between SAP and LO in 1946
and subsequently renewed with slight alternations in 1958
and 1966,27
The reasons for limiting worker participation in this way
related to the power resources of the parties and their ideolo-
gical orientations. Although the SAP controlled the govern-
ment, they only occasionally held an absolute majority and,
therefore, could not be too aggressive in their legislative
program. Moreover, the SAP's strategy emphasized con-
sumption politics over production politics. Managerial con-
trol over production, including the power of capital to trans-
form the labour process, was conceded in the belief that
this would promote economic growth. But free enterprise
was to be socially controlled to insure that an appropriate
share of the benefits of economic growth would be funnelled
to the working class. Central to this strategy was a strong
commitment to full employment which protected workers
against the dislocations resulting from economic rationaliza-
tion. Thus a form of progressive Keynesianism emerged as
the major strategy of the social democratic party in the
1930s and set the pattern for Sweden's social and economic
development in the buoyant postwar period.28
The development of health and safety regulation in
Sweden, including the role of worker participation, reflected
the pattern of these compromises. Workers experienced dif-
ficulty participating in the regulatory process created by
the first health and safety legislation. In particular, they
had difficulty effectively communicating with the inspectors
who made the operative decisions about the legislation's
requirements. To remedy this, workers at some locations
elected representatives to present their grievances to the
inspectors. Thus, the origin of the safety delegate was not
to represent workers' interests to the employer, but rather
to state officials. In 1912 Sweden enacted the Workers'
Protection Act (WPA) which consolidated earlier legislation
and tightened up many of the safety rules. As well, the
WPA formally recognized the 'worker delegate' and re-
quired the inspector to consult with such delegates where
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they existed. The institution of the worker delegate did not,
however, develop very rapidly at first. In 1920 there were
only 300 work places in Sweden with such a delegate.
In the 1930s there was a shift in the focus ofregulatory
policy. Rather than emphasizing direct state regulation over
health and safety at work, amendments to the WPA in 1931
and 1938 encouraged greater cooperation between com-
panies and workers in the achievement of safer work places.
One way this cooperation was to be accomplished was by
changing the role of safety delegates. Their primary function
was no longer to represent the interests of workers to the
inspector, but rather to the employer. The 1931 amendment
urged workers in industry, construction and transportation
to elect one or more such safety delegates. The 1938 law
stated that safety delegates 'should' be elected and expanded
the areas in which the institution was to be encouraged,
including forestry and coke oven operations. As a result of
these legislative urgings the numbers of delegates grew con-
siderably so that by 1935 there were 2,000 and by 1940
the number had doubled.
The 1938 law also suggested that joint safety committees
should be formed in larger work places in order to promote
health and safety at work. Such committees had already
been created in a number of companies prior to the legis-
lation, but the law encouraged their diffusion. By 1940 there
were approximately 300 joint safety committees in exist-
ence.
The Basic Agreement of 1938 encouraged greater con-
sultation between labour and capital generally, and laid the
foundation for the development of further central agree-
ments between the parties on more specific issues. In 1942
LO and SAF reached a central agreement on labour protec-
tion issues. This agreement included rules for local safety
organizations, including the election of safety delegates and
the establishment of joint safety committees in work places
of certain sizes. A bipartite agency, the Joint Industrial
Safety Council (ASN) was established by the parties to as-
sist in the development of local safety work and the promo-
tion of occupational health and safety more generally.
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In 1949 a revised WPA was enacted. The Act created
the National Board of Occupational Safety and Health
(ASS), a tripartite authority with responsibility for im-
plementing the Act. The Act required, rather than merely
encouraged, the election of safety delegates in work places
with five or more employees and the establishment of joint
safety committees in work places with fifty or more em-
ployees. Furthermore, it provided that a trade union could,
with the approval of ASS, appoint safety delegates from
outside the group of employees in a place of work. This
supported the development of regional safety delegates to
represent workers in small work places. Safety delegates
were not to be hindered in the conduct of their duties and
they were to be protected against retaliatory actions by the
employer.
The organization of local safety work and the role of
workers was spelled out more fully in a regulation issued
by the government and in revisions to the basic agreement
between LO and SAF in 1951. The most important points
were that the employer and the union were obliged to edu-
cate safety delegates so that they could properly perform
their duties. Delegates were directed to inform themselves
of the conditions in their areas, to promote health and safety
at work and to enlist the cooperation of other employees
for this purpose. If a delegate considered that a particular
safety measure should be taken, he or she was directed to
make a proposal to the employer who in tum was required
to reply without delay. If the delegate's proposal was not
considered within a reasonable time the delegate was
authorized to request the inspector's intervention. The dele-
gate was authorized to submit requests directly to a safety
committee where one existed and was also given the right
to obtain information including any instructions issued by
the inspector and the results of any tests conducted in the
work place. The agreement further provided that delegates
have access to accident and sick leave statistics. The in-
spectors were required to contact safety delegates when car-
rying out inspections and,by agreement, the delegate was
given the right to be present during the inspection and to
be paid by the employer for the time so spent.
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It is clear that worker participation at the local level was
based on a consultative model. No actual decision-making
authority was given to either the safety delegate or the joint
committee. The legal right of employers to manage their
enterprises and to control production remained unchal-
lenged, provided of course that the employer did not violate
standards of conduct established by the state. The superior
position of the employer in this regard was acknowledged
and affirmed in the legislation. Section 39 stated:
With a view to achieving safe and healthy working conditions
in the place of employment, the employer and persons employed
by him shall collaborate under the direction of the employer
in maintaining a suitably organized safety service (my em-
phasis).
The legal and contractual arrangements made during this
period remained in place until the 1970s. During this period
the number of safety delegates increased slowly but steadily,
as did the number of safety committees and regional
delegates, notwithstanding that the number of work places
actually decreased, probably as a result of increased con-
centration in ownership and the decline of smaller firms.29
In sum, the pattern of social democratic regulation that
emerged in Sweden during this period was premised on party
and trade union strength in the political arena and in the
labour market. This power was exercised to advance elemen-
tary working class interests in worker protection, employ-
ment security, and social security. Moreover, worker par-
ticipation in the administration of state programs and an
active union presence on the shopfloor was firmly institu-
tionalized, thereby providing both a foundation and an
orientation for the future development of power resources.
Private ownership and control of the means of production,
however, was not seriously challenged at this time and
employers were free to rationalize their production proces-
ses, subject only to consultative procedures and, in the area
of occupational health and safety, minimum standards legis-
lation. This left employer power resources substantially in
tact.
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Participation and the Challenge to Fordism in Sweden
A new wave of occupational health and safety reform began
in the late 1960s and its directions and implications are not
yet fully settled. Essentially, this wave of regulation can
be seen as one which arose out of and addressed the dif-
ficulties which had been developing within the structures
of accumulation and legitimation established previously.
One point of pressure resulted from changes in the inter-
national economy which challenged the competitiveness of
Sweden's traditional export industries. Economic ration-
alization entailed job loss and drives to increase pro-
ductivity. Moreover, younger workers, perhaps because of
the economic security they had enjoyed during their lives,
were less willing to accept some of the conditions which
had been present before this new wave of rationalization.
Because of the government's commitment to full employ-
ment policies, rank and file concerns came to be focused
on work place issues and gave rise to new demands of a
qualitative character.t? Workers were refusing to accept ex-
clusive managerial authority over the labour process and
were demanding that they be given a right to participate in
decisions affecting production organization. The most dra-
matic manifestation of labour discontent was the wave of
wildcat strikes which began in December 1969 when 5,000
miners in the state-owned mines in Northern Sweden walked
off the job, their principle demand being the abolition of
piece rates in favour of fixed monthly salaries. These un-
official strikes spread to major manufacturing firms in
central Sweden. Worker discontent also manifested itself in
individual actions reflected in high rates of turnover and
absenteeism. In brief, dissatisfaction rooted in the employer-
led rationalization of the labour process raised the priority
of the politics of production over the politics of consump-
tion, and concerns over the work environment were in the
forefront of this new orientation.U
Employers responded to these concerns by initiating ex-
periments in work organization designed to increase job sat-
isfaction,32 while workers emphasized the need to deal with
the causes of the problem. Without repudiating the need
for economic efficiency as the premise of a healthy eco-
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nomy, workers demanded to be given a voice in decision
making. This would ensure that their needs and concerns
were taken into account. Moreover, researchers in Scan-
dinavia provided an important scientific foundation for the
argument that improvements in the work environment re-
quired democratization of work organization.P The upshot
was that workers pressured the SAP to embark on a program
of legislative reform designed to give workers greater rights
to participate in and to challenge managerial decisions.
The first wave of reform legislation was aimed at
strengthening industrial democracy through the development
of co-determination, collective bargaining and shopfloor
participation, including health and safety. With regard to
co-determination, legislation was enacted in 1972 providing
for two union representatives on boards of directors employ-
ing 100 or more employees. Later this was extended to com-
panies employing 25 or more workers. In the area of col-
lective bargaining, the Co-Determination Act (1976) incor-
porated the previous collective bargaining legislation of
1920, 1928 and 1936, but struck a blow at clause 32 which
had limited bargaining over areas of managerial prerogative
in regard to work organization. In effect, the legislation
created a new framework for the negotiation of co-deter-
mination agreements between the labour market parties.
Finally, in the area of shopfloor participation, union
stewards were given greater rights and protections including
rights to information, time and training for union work at
the employers expense and protection against discrimination
and retaliation.H
In the area of health and safety, legislation was enacted
in 1973 and then again in 1977. Its broader scope was sig-
nalled in its title, The Work Environment Act. Health and
safety regulation was to include not only the physical, but
also the psychological well-being of the worker. Moreover,
it enshrined the concept that worker control is a critical
aspect of a healthy work environment. "Working conditions
must be adapted to human physical and mental aptitudes.
The aim must be for work to be arranged in such a way
that the employee himself can influence his work situation."
To strengthen worker influence in local health and safety
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work, the position of safety steward was strengthened. Safe-
ty delegates were given the right to halt any dangerous pro-
cess pending an investigation by the inspector. They were
also given the right to participate in the planning of new
premises, devices, work processes, working methods and
the use of substances liable to cause ill health or accidents,
while employers were required to inform delegates of any
changes having significant bearing on conditions in the
areas they represented. Employers were also required to re-
spond to representations made by safety delegates without
delay and, failing a satisfactory resolution, the matter could
either be referred to the inspector or to the joint employer-
employee safety committee, where there was one.3S Under
the legislation, joint committees were required in work
places with 50 or more employees or where employees de-
manded one. Committees were required to plan and super-
vise local health and safety work.
Following the enactment of the legislation, a new Work-
ing Environment Agreement was negotiated between SAF,
LO and PTK in 1976.36 The agreement provided more de-
tailed rules and guidelines for the implementation of the
law, the most important being that: 1) workers were given
a majority of one on the joint committee; 2) at least one
employer member on the committee had to hold a mana-
gerial position in the firm; 3) the committee was defined
as a decision-making and advisory body; 4) the committee
was given authority over company health services including
the appointment of company doctors and safety engineers;
and 5) unanimous decisions of the committee on budgetary
matters were made binding on the company, but if unanimity
could not be reached, any member could refer the matter
to the lnspector.t?
While this wave of legislation was being enacted, LO
began exploring ways of promoting economic democracy.
A committee chaired by Rudolph Meidner developed the
Wage Earner Funds concept which would require employers
to issue new stock in relation to their profits which would
be owned collectively by employees. Over time, this would
eventually give employees majority ownership in private
corporations. LO endorsed the proposal in 1976. Although
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the proposal was designed to respond to a number of con-
cerns, including the need to secure wage restraint in the
face of high corporate profits, in its initial form the Wage
Earner Fund proposal was directly linked to a broader pro-
gram of social transformation.If
In sum, the creation of stronger institutional structures
for worker participation in health and safety occurred during
a period of radicalization in Sweden. The promotion of in-
dustrial and economic democracy included the idea that
workers should exercise greater control over the work en-
vironment. Indeed, concerns about the work environment
and the linkage between the organization of work and human
health played a radicalizing role within the Swedish labour
movement.
The translation of these concerns into new institutional
forms for participation did not, however, determine the way
these forms would be used.39 Although new institutional
conditions of participation were legislated and negotiated,
other conditions continued to vary, including changes in
the relative power resources and ideological orientations of
labour and capital. First of all, the defeat of the SAP in
the elections of 1976 and 1979 had serious consequences.
Not only did it diminish workers' political power, it also
undermined their labour market power since employers no
longer had to negotiate under the threat of legislative in-
tervention. Second, the LO lost some of its influence over
the SAP, resulting in a strengthening of forces favouring
the "logic of electoral competition." This entailed the pur-
suit of cross-class electoral support and the de-radicalization
of SAP's program. Third, Sweden was not immune from
the extended international recession of the early seventies
and the continuing squeeze this put on the profits of an
export-oriented economy. Moreover, the increasing con-
centration and internationalization of Swedish capital
strengthened its ability to impose its economic and ideologi-
cal agenda. These pressures have influenced the SAP's
policies since its return to power in 1982. It has not brought
forward any new proposals to advance industrial or
economic democracy. The watered down version of the
Wage Earner Fund proposal enacted in 1983 eliminated any
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linkage between it and the achievement of greater worker
control over corporate decision making. Overall, the em-
phasis of the government has been to promote the private
sector as the engine of economic growth.40
The extent to which these changes in the larger political,
economic and ideological climate affected worker participa-
tion in health and safety is difficult to gauge. Certainly, the
number of work sites with safety delegates and safety com-
mittees has grown steadily from 38,322 and 8,174 in 1976
to 68,883 and 26,210 in 1986.41 Currently, there are approx-
imately 110,000 trained worker safety delegates.42 These
figures suggest that these institutions are expanding and that
workers are obtaining the technical capacity to participate.
They do not, of course, indicate whether workers are using
these structures of participation to enhance their power and
to exert greater control over their work environment. How-
ever, some indirect indicators can be examined.
The number of reported work refusals has been decreas-
ing from 167 in 1978 to 70 in 1984.43 This statistic, how-
ever, is not a very powerful indicator of worker participation
as it is open to radically different, but equally plausible
interpretations. It could be viewed as an indicator of declin-
ing worker militance or as a sign that employers are more
responsive to worker demands and that as a result, fewer
work refusals reach the stage of being reported to the in-
spector.
A second possible indicator is changes in the rate of oc-
cupational injuries. These increased from an annual average
of 22.8 injuries per million person-hours over the period
1970 to 1977 to 26 over the period 1977 to 1983.44 Again.
however, increasing injury rates do not indicate that worker
participation has become less effective. Given the way sta-
tistics are gathered, increases in injury rates may indicate
greater employee awareness of the relation between work
and health resulting in more accurate reporting and cor-
respondingly higher recorded rates of occupational injury.
LO surveys conducted in 1970 and 1980 show that such an
increase has indeed occurred.O
These surveys also revealed that safety representatives
were encountering significant difficulties in obtaining satis-
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factory solutions to the problems they raised. Only half of
the problems raised by safety delegates had been inves-
tigated by the employer, and only one-quarter of the com-
plaints resulted in countermeasures being taken. When
measures were taken, the perception of their effectiveness
varied depending on the nature of the problem. As well,
union members who reported concerns to their safety dele-
gates or to management did not think that the measures
taken had been satisfactory. A more recent study concluded
that the reforms of the 1970s have not improved health and
safety in Swedish industry. Health and safety committees
were found to be active, but were exercising little influence
on production decisions.46
A commonly expressed view of trade unionists, govern-
ment officials and employer representatives was that safety
delegates and committees did not have the authority or the
power necessary to assume the responsibility for the safety
of the work environment, even though some employers had
attempted to shift this burden on to them. It was argued
that in many cases employers used these structures to hive
off the safety organization from the production organization,
thereby marginalizing it and making it less effective. There-
fore, much discussion has focused on ways of integrating
health and safety concerns into the highest levels of the
firm's decision-making processes. The extent to which
worker participation was to accompany this integration was
less clear. Representatives from LO wanted to create a safety
organization with worker representatives which would paral-
lel the production organization so that worker repre-
sentatives would be consulted at all stages. They recognized,
however, that employers were resisting worker participation
at the higher levels of corporate decision making. SAP in-
deed appears to be opposed to more worker involvement,
and instead sees safety committees as essentially advisory
bodies, there to prod the employer to take appropriate ac-
tion. Similarly, the Labour Inspectorate's current strategy
is directed at building safety into the production organiza-
tion; they do not see safety committees and worker par-
ticipation as the primary means of achieving this objec-
tive.47
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Trade union officials were also aware of other problems.
First, the worker majority on committees was composed of
delegates from all the unions represented in the work place.
In a large firm, this could consist of production workers,
clerical workers, professional and technical workers and
front-line supervisors. As a result, there was often a diver-
gence of interests which had to be resolved and, in some
cases, the worker representatives were likely to see health
and safety from the employers' perspective. A second con-
cern expressed by some was that committee members and
safety delegates often tended to become complacent and
isolated from the membership. A variety of explanations
were offered for this phenomenon. The crudest one was
that workers were "bought off' by being given better posi-
tions or more favourable conditions. Others were that health
and safety representatives were overwhelmed by technical
arguments and, therefore, tended to defer to those with more
'expertise'; that, they were not always sufficiently linked
to the local union; and that, like most people, they tended
to avoid conflict and as a result were satisfied if there was
a dialogue with the employer. Finally, there seemed to be
a general consensus that delegates and committees were
more effective in dealing with the small immediate hazards
that arose in the work place than with more serious systemic
ones which required costly investment or substantial chan-
ges in work practices and organization.R
In sum, it seems that the development of worker par-
ticipation in health and safety at the local level has stalled
in much the same way as has the movement for industrial
and economic democracy. Institutional opportunities for par-
ticipation have been created and used, but in the current
climate it is unlikely that the legal right of workers to par-
ticipate in planning as it affects health and safety will be-
come effective until workers are able to gain greater in-
fluence in corporate decision making more generally. So
far, the experience with co-determination agreements has
been disappointing and it seems that workers have lost the
initiative. The Agreement on Efficiency and Participation
negotiated by LO, PTK. and SAP promises workers more
employment security and job satisfaction in exchange for
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increased efficiency and productivity, but does little to pro-
vide workers with more effective contro1.49 New initiatives
to improve the work environment no longer emphasize
worker control but are turning to other regulatory instru-
ments. For instance, it has recently been suggested that
employers should be given economic incentives to improve
safety conditions through the imposition of a payroll levy
which would reflect the sickness and disability levels of
the firm.sO
Lessons for Ontario Recent work in comparative political
economy has emphasized the need to take seriously salient
differences between social formations when assessing the
possibility of using similar strategic responses to common
pressures they face.Sl A thorough comparison between the
development of occupational health and safety regulation
in Sweden and Ontario is beyond the scope of this paper,
but we can highlight a few of the significant differences.
As indicated earlier, prior to 1900, the regulatory respon-
ses of Sweden and Ontario were substantially similar. Both
jurisdictions relied on weakly enforced minimum-standards
legislation which provided workers with few opportunities
to participate directly, other than through bargaining. Sig-
nificant differences did not begin to develop until the first
decades of the twentieth century when, as a result of their
greater success in building economic and political power
resources and their more socialist ideological orientation,
Swedish workers legally institutionalized their right to par-
ticipate by way of consultation through worker health and
safety delegates and joint committees. By way of contrast,
workers in Ontario suffered major setbacks in the 1920s
and were unable to make any significant legislative gains
in health and safety regulation until the 1970s. During the
interwar years, worker participation schemes were primarily
a management initiative designed as a substitute for inde-
pendent trade union representation. One of the architects
of this approach was Mackenzie King who recommended
the creation of employee representation plans to facilitate
cordial relations and to promote industrial efficiency. Health
and safety was one of the issues to be addressed through
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these plans.52 A second source of employee participation
was through the employer-initiated "Safety First" movement
which began in the steel industry. In addition to conducting
educational programs and safety competitions. employers
also established safety committees whose membership in-
cluded workers appointed by supervisors. Lacking decision-
making power. these committees were designed to monitor
conditions on the shopfloor and to provide a conduit for
communication between workers and employers. Although
enthusiasm for experiments in company welfare work faded
significantly after the 1920s. the phenomenon of safety com-
mittees survived into the 1960s. especially in large
unionized work places.53 Yet. workers did not institution-
alize their right to participate in health and safety. even on
a consultative basis. through nationally or provincially
negotiated agreements with employers. or through legisla-
tion. despite Royal Commission recommendations for such
steps in 1950. 1960 and 1967.54
The creation of statutory rights to know. to refuse unsafe
work. and to participate in Ontario and most other Canadian
jurisdictions in the 1970s represents a significant break with
past practice and needs to be explained. According to Wal-
ters. the passage of new health and safety legislation in
Ontario can be attributed to the state's increasing interest
in lowering health care costs associated with work-related
illness and injury.55 This concern partially accounts for the
second wave of legislation. but does not illuminate the
choice of regulatory strategy. In particular. it does not reveal
why governments made concessions to labour over the right
to refuse and the right to be consulted. From a power
resource perspective. there is no basis for arguing that
Canadian workers were able to get these rights because of
a relative increase in the strength of their labour market
organizations. Electoral successes by social democratic par-
ties did. however. play a role. It was under a NDP govern-
ment in Saskatchewan that these rights were first legislated
in Canada;56 and they were enacted in Ontario during a
period of minority government in which the NDP was more
influential than usual. Yet. a fuller explanation must go be-
yond these immediate indicators of power. Equally impor-
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tant is a point noted earlier: the experience of death, injury
and disease at work raises contradictions in a regime of
accumulation in a particularly sharp form. This was cer-
tainly the case in the 1970s, a period in which awareness
of, and concerns about, the relationship between the general
environment and human health were increasing. For workers
faced with conditions that arguably were becoming more
dangerous as a result of technological rationalization, the
work environment became a focal point of their health con-
cerns.57 Health and safety conditions became a lightning
rod for more generalized worker and trade union dissatis-
faction with existing managerial and state practices which
provided little opportunity for participation. Moreover,
government and industry were particularly vulnerable to
claims made about the adverse health effects of the existing
regime because of the better than average possibilities that
labour could build cross-class alliances to support their
demands for reform.
Finally, we must also consider what impact these changes
had on employers and the state. Employers had little to fear
from the creation of consultative committees which did not
reduce their control over production. Moreover, they stood
to gain in at least two ways. First, the creation of a more
participatory internal responsibility system was likely to re-
duce pressure for stronger direct state regulation. Second,
the participatory structures created by statute coincided with
the introduction of new management techniques designed
to address low worker morale and motivation.58 They could
be incorporated into this larger strategy and help realize its
benefits. The strongest worker right and, therefore, the one
most strenuously resisted, was the right to refuse unsafe
work. Clearly, employers did not stand to benefit from the
right to refuse, but their potential losses were not as great
as some imagined because that right was already weakly
embedded in the common law and more strongly supported
in arbitration decisions under collective bargaining agree-
ments.59 For the government, the creation of a more par-
ticipatory internal responsibility system would hopefully de-
flect some of the pressure that might otherwise be brought
to bear on them to intervene more forcefully and directly
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in regulating the work environment. Primary responsibility
was assigned to the labour market parties; the role of the
state was to facilitate, not to enforce.
The context in which these rights were obtained also
helps explain why they resemble the rights Swedish workers
acquired in 1949, and not the stronger rights obtained in
the 1970s. Only in Saskatchewan was there an attempt in
the late 1970s and early 1980s to implement changes along
the lines of the Scandinavian developments of the 1970s,
but these efforts came to an abrupt halt after the NDP
government was defeated in 1982.60 Similarly, when the
former Liberal Ontario government proposed in Bill 208 to
give workers something resembling a unilateral right to shut
down unsafe operations, it backed down in the face of stren-
uous employer opposition.s! Although some collective
agreements provide for this right, most do not. The general
inability of Canadian workers to construct and institution-
alize strong participatory rights through collective bargain-
ing or legislation reflects the relatively weaker power re-
sources they can bring to bear either directly on the state
and on employers, or indirectly by controlling the external
environment of the firm.62
The ability of workers in Ontario to effectively use their
limited participatory rights was influenced by these same
conditions.63 Needless to say, numerous problems emerged.
Because the joint committees lacked any decision-making
power whatsoever, the ability of workers to obtain improve-
ments to the work environment depended on their ability
to convince their employers of the need for such changes.
Changes which were mutually beneficial to workers and
employers were likely to be implemented, but when con-
flicts emerged, workers depended on either their economic
bargaining power or the law to exert influence. Few sub-
stantive gains were actually made through collective bar-
gaining. If the problem involved a violation of minimum
standards established by law, the inspector could, in theory,
be relied upon as a resource. The inspectors, however, were
instructed to facilitate the operation of the internal respon-
sibility system in order to achieve compliance. Thus, it was
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difficult to invoke the coercive power of the law in support
of worker demands.64
A second major area of difficulty was with regard to
information. Frequently workers' representatives lacked
adequate technical training so that they were easily intim-
idated by experts or were unable to identify or understand
the problems they faced in the work place. More extensive
right to know legislation such as WHMIS has provided a
partial remedy.65 Increased worker education conducted by
the labour movement, with partial state funding, has also
helped reduce some of the disparity. Note, however, that
there is nothing like the Work Environment Fund or the Work-
ing Life Centre which provide valuable research capabilities
in Sweden.66 Knowledge is still a resource whose production,
transmission and use is predominantly controlled by em-
ployers to the disadvantage of workers.
A third major problem area was that health and safety
representatives were often isolated from the work force and
from the union. In part, this was intentional. The early
government promoters of worker participation assumed that
health and safety was not an area of conflict between labour
and management. Therefore, they called for a separation
between collective bargaining and occupational health and
safety regulation. To the extent that disagreements emerged,
worker representatives were encouraged to promote a
favourable view of the employer's efforts even if they were
not satisfactory.s? It is, therefore, not surprising that studies
have shown that health and safety representatives are poorly
linked with the work force.68
Linkage was also a problem in Sweden. This is probably
inevitable, to some degree, whenever bipartite structures of
this sort are put into place. It seems, however, that the ten-
dency for worker representatives to lose their perspective
has been countered more effectively in Sweden. The trade
union movement there actively promotes the view that
health and safety is an issue of class conflict and not merely
a technical problem.s? In Ontario some health and safety
activists complain that the basic training given to health
and safety representatives by the OFL focuses on technical
issues at the expense of political ones. In response, some
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unions provide their own programs in order to give their
representatives the political outlook and skills they believe
are required for effective action. There is, moreover, pres-
sure on trade union leaders to adopt strategies and approaches
which contain militant rank and file behaviour, whether it
be in the area of health and safety or other aspects of labour
relations. In part this stems from a legal obligation imposed
on trade union officials in Ontario not to support, encourage,
or threaten an unlawful strike. Aside from legal pressures,
unions have also bought into institutional arrangements
which structure participation and contain it within carefully
defined channels. Outbreaks of shopfloor activism may not
respect those limits and may embarrass the leadership which
has consented to them. Moreover, discipline and unity with-
in the labour movement are themselves power resources,
but their acquisition and maintenance have often favoured
bureaucratic strategies which put the leadership at odds with
activists trying to build a social movement at the base. When
this happens, unions may not only limit one current source
of power, the ability to disrupt, but also forego the chance
to build a more powerful organization in the future,7o
This brings us back to the questions asked at the begin-
ning of this paper. To what extent and under what conditions
can new opportunities for worker participation be created
and used to improve the work environment and strengthen
the labour movement? The debate within the Ontario labour
movement over Bill 208 was but one manifestation of the
dilemmas it faces in developing a responsive strategy to
government and employer initiatives. Under Bill 208, unions
were given the opportunity to participate in the Workplace
Health and Safety Agency, a bipartite institution vested with
regulatory authority to establish and implement some stand-
ards and programs for health and safety education and train-
ing. The long term strategy of the Liberal government was
to delegate further regulatory authority to this Agency. In
return for their participation, labour obtained, initially,
shared control over funds for health and safety training and
a say in establishing program criteria. At the work place
level, fewer workers will be excluded from the participatory
rights created in the 1970s, but little was done to strengthen
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those rights. As noted earlier, the strongest participatory
right initially proposed, the right of certified worker inspec-
tors to unilaterally shut down dangerous operations pending
the arrival of the inspector, was watered down in the final
draft so that now a certified worker representative needs
the agreement of the certified employer representative for
a shutdown to occur.
The cost of participation under these conditions, however,
is potentially quite high. First, by redelegating authority
over health and safety to the labour market parties, regula-
tion may become more market-driven, an outcome which,
under current conditions, favours capital because of its su-
perior market power. Moreover, under the new framework,
organized labour may be partially demobilized because: it
will have consented to and participated in the bipartite pro-
cess of standard setting'[! and administration which was sub-
stituted for a more directly political one; it will have made
its representational credibility dependent on certified ex-
pertise rather than on shopfloor support; and it may not
support its own rank and file activists who criticize the
joint policies that are produced. Finally, organized labour
faces a loss of autonomy in the design and delivery of its
own training programs since, in order to qualify for state
funding, bipartite governing boards will have to be estab-
lished.
New amendments to OHSA are not a high priority for
the NDP government. This creates a space to reconsider
the direction health and safety reform should take. Copying
Swedish approaches without considering the conditions
which both support and limit their effectiveness is ill-ad-
vised. The success of Swedish workers in obtaining stronger
participatory rights is a function of their labour market and
political organization, and the ideology which has oriented
the direction in which those resources are committed. Yet,
our study has also shown that only limited success has been
achieved under their current health and safety regime. The
participatory institutions created for health and safety have
been hived off from central authority in the firm which
continues to make decisions about how production is to be
organized and when and where capital is to be invested. It
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seems that major progress in strengthening workers' control
over their immediate environment cannot be achieved with-
out advances in economic democracy generally. The second
major lesson to be drawn is that although state power may
be used to create new sites of struggle and to alter the
balance between labour and capital. its actual impact de-
pends on the ability of the people affected to use effectively
the rights they have obtained. This is one of the lessons
that has been learned in Sweden.
Workplace democracy cannot simply be introduced through
stronger labor legislation. Legislation must be accompanied by
a widespread shop-floor struggle for democracy, which will cre-
ate strong and continuing pressure for further institutional
change. The absence of such an interaction between shop-floor
activism and legislative reform can to a great extent explain
the failure of workplace democracy in Sweden.72
Even strong participatory rights, at best, create opportunities
for reform; they do not determine the results which will be
achieved.
In sum. the objective should be to strengthen and develop
power resources at all levels with a view toward promoting
a long-term process of 'encroaching control' which will ul-
timately challenge the hegemony of capital.73 This requires
legal. organizational and ideological strategies (not neces-
sarily in that order). Legislation giving workers the stronger
legal rights that Swedish workers currently enjoy would be
desireable, but it is not enough. Prosecutions of employers
under the Criminal Code in appropriate cases would both
strengthen the hand of workers in their immediate dealings
with employers and help change the public perception of
the seriousness of employer misconduct in the work place.74
There is also an urgent need to find ways of increasing
worker control over the state's health and safety bureau-
cracy. This would help reorient its activities and counter
the pressures to accomodate employer demands for flexi-
bility. Increased worker control. however. can only occur
if trade unions become committed to this goal ideologically
and adopt an organizational practice consistent with its
achievement. As a starting point. the labour movement should
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integrate the theme of workers' control into their conception
of a safe and healthy work environment and insist that ideol-
ogy and politics find a prominent place in its health and
safety training.
The process of democratizing health and safety regulation
will be a highly contested, drawn out struggle. Events in
Sweden, where the power resources of workers are far more
developed, attest to this. Therefore, it is all the more im-
portant that the possibilities for action which arise at
favourable conjunctures not be squandered.
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